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payment within a reasonable time. Williston is opposed to the view
of the Kentucky court
In this dictum, the court is directly in opposition to previous Kentucky cases, none of which were cited in the
opinion. In Martin v. Ferguson,' the court said that if a promise is to
pay when able, then the ability of the promisor is the essence of the
promise, and it should be averred and proved. It was further held in
this state that a condition making an obligation to pay in money dependent upon the covenantor's ability to pay constituted a valid condition precedent. It would seem that the language of the extract from
Page cited above would apply equally in these Kentucky cases as in
the case under discussion, yet in'the former cases the happening of the
act was construed as a condition. Only one Kentucky case could be
found contra to these cases as to the effect of a promise to pay when
able, and that case was decided long before any of the others cited."°
Other states have held a promise to pay when able to be a valid condition precedent."
The conclusion which we must arrive at from a
consideration of the above authorities is that the promise to pay when
able to complete the building should have been construed as a valid
condition precedent.
The court expressly refused to consider the matter of consideration in the compromise agreement. This is where the court seems to
have erred. It is submitted that the court should have allowed the
action on this basis. A promise to pay a doubtful claim is sufficient
consideration for a promise to forbear." But since the promise was
to pay when the promisor deemed it advisable, it was illusory and In
fact no promise.u A promise which does not bind the promisor is not
sufficient consideration for a return promise.'
Therefore the compromise agreement was void for lack of consideration, and recovery
should have been allowed under the original contract.
JoHN L. DAvis.
BAILMENTS-GROSS

NEGLIGENCE AND THE LIABILITY OF A
GRATUITOUS BAILEE

A, being confined in jail, requested B to take and keep for him a
bag of gold money, to the end that it might not be lost. B did as
requested, and placed the gold in a trunk, in which she kept her own
money, and locked it. The gold was stolen along with a quantity of
B's own money. The court ruled--citing several Kentucky cases12 Williston: Treatise on Contracts (1920), Section 804.
'3 Ky. L. Rep. 445 (1881).
"Stanton's Admr. v. Brown, 36 Ky. 248 (1838).
10Kancaid v. Higgins, 1 Bibb 369 (Ky. 1809).
"Van Buskirk v. Kuhns, 164 Cal. 472, 129 Pac. 587 (1913); Denney
v. Wheelright, 60 Miss. 733 (1883); Work v. Beach, 59 Hun. 625, 13
N. Y. Supp. 678 (1891); and Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 572 (1854).
"Restatement Contracts, Sections 77, 79.
"Restatement Contracts, Section 2, Comment b.
"Williston, Contracts, Section 10Be.
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that a gratuitous bailee, where the bailment is for the sole benefit of
the bailor, need only exercise slight care and was liable only for gross
negligence or bad faith, and therefore, is not bound to exercise that
degree of care and diligence which under the circumstances a person
of ordinary prudence and care would have used if it had been his own
money. The court's decision is believed to be correct in view of the
facts found. However, the rule of law as laid down in this case is the
basis of the following discussion.
Bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor are of two types:
depositum, where goods are transferred to a bailee merely for safe
keeping; mandatum, where there is a delivery of goods to a bailee
who is to carry them or do some act about them gratis-i. e., without
reward for such work or carriage.'
There is little doubt but that the Kentucky court follows the
majority rule, that is, that a gratuitous bailee, where the bailment is
for the sole benefit of the bailor, need only use slight care and is
liable only in case of gross negligence or bad faith.
This rule and all its derivations are the direct result of the doctrine laid down by Lord Holt in the celebrated case of Uoggs v.
Bermrd. 4 The vagueness of the rule gives the courts no little difficulty. The lack of uniformity of interpretation is not strange. No
other legal principle remains in a state of greater obscurity or confusion.' To point out one of the various interpretations which have
been given to the term "gross negligence", it may be noted in the
case of Scole8 v. Weaver,6 "gross negligence" for which a gratuitous
bailee would be responsible was said to be, "nothing more than a failutre to bestow that care which the property in the situation demands."
Again, a depositary may absolve himself from liability by using the
same diligence in preserving the deposit that he uses in preserving
his own property.7 But note that a party cannot absolve himself from
IHargis v. Spencer, 254 Ky. 297, 71 S. W. (2d) 666 (1934).
3 Hale, Bailments and Carriers, p. 38-41.
sRidgely Operating Co. v. Weaver, 157 Ark. 167, 247 S. W. 773
(1923); Cadwell v. Peninsular State Bank, 195 Mich. 407, 162 N. W.
89 (1917); Dow-Arneson Co. v. St. Paul, 191 Minn. 28, 253 N. W. 6
(1934); Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923); D. A.
Shulte, Inc., v. North Terminal Garage Co.-Mass.-197 N. E. 16
(1935); Spencer v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, 167 S. C.
36, 165 S. E. 731 (1932); Carwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian,
Inc., 159 Wash. 92, 292 P. 412 (1930); Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
Armes, 217 Ala. 464, 1ly So. 46 (1928); Anderson v. Hule, 23 Ky. L.
Rep. 1115, 64 S. W. 849 (1901); Dunn v. Kyle, 14 Bush (Ky.) 344
(1874); United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) 609
(1873); Green v. Hooingsworth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173 (1837); Bakewell v.
Talbot, 4 Dana (Ky.) 216 (1836); Trevathon v. Farmer's Bank, 174
Ky. 22, 191 S. W. 644 (1917).
'2 Ld. Rame 909 (1703).
'Kegan v. Park Band, 320 Mo. 623, 8 S. W. (2d) 858 (1927).
6157 Ark. 167, 247 S. W. 773 (1923).
'Rothschild & Co. v. Lynch, 157 La. 849, 103 So. 188 (1925); Miles
V. International RIotel Co. 289 fI1. 320, 124 N. E. 599 (1919).
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liability by showing himself negligent with his own property. These
two interpretations lend no aid whatever in finding a "solving phrase",
adapted to explain the doctrine of gross negligence or slight care. The
failure to exercise slight care amounts to gross negligence. It is to
be observed, however, that the courts, in the above cases, are trying to
avoid the strict application of the term, gross negligence, by substituting other phrases which are explanatory in nature.
Upon the assumption that a bank held bonds as a gratuitous
bailee, its liability was held to depend upon whether it failed to exercise that care which business men of prudence would exercise in keeping property of like value, and the court stressed the point that such
must not be less than that which the bailee habitually employed in
regard to its own property of the same kind.? But an instruction that
a bank, gratuitous bailee of liberty bonds, "was under no greater
obligation than to care for them as it did for its own valuables" was
held erroneous in Mahoney v. Merchant's Ban*.1
Apparently the
courts, while attempting to define gross negligence, or to state what
amounts to gross negligence, are coming dangerously close to saying
that gross negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care
which the circumstances demand of a prudent person. A survey of
several decisions, with probably a few exceptions, will substantiate
this contention.
The following quotation may shed a little light on the problem
confronting the courts when an attempt is made to lay down an abstract definition of the term "gross negligence".
"Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in
magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more want
of care than constitutes simple inadvertence.
It is an act or
omission respecting a legal duty of an aggravated character, as
distinguished from mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is
very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the
want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present
legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as
other persons may be affected. It is heedless and palpable violation of a legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element
of culpability which characterizes all negligence is, in gross negligence, magnified to a high degree as compared with that present
in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is manifestly smaller
amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence.""
These nice words only add to the obscurity and confusion. This
interpretation is greatly in need of explanation. It is another attempt
to distinguish between the three degrees of negligence, an old doctrine
which has been the subject of many discussions.
Gross negligence has been construed to mean a failure to exercise
' Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 Pac. 12 (1920).
Kubli v. First Nat. Bank, 193 Ia. 883, 186 N .W. 42 (1922).
141 Ark. 578, 217 S. W. 782 (1920).
"Altman V. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 505 (1919).
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slight care, 2 or reasonable care," or is merely negligence with a vituperative epithet. ' Again, gross negligence has been interpreted as a
fraud in legal effect," or as the equivalent to breach of faith," or as
the omission of the care taken by unattentive or thoughtless persons in
their own concerns,"7 or as the care which the bailee takes of his own
property," or as nothing more than simple negligence or want of due
care."
In Kentucky the degree of care which is necessary to avoid the
Imputation of bad faith is estimated by the carefulness which the
depositary uses toward his own property of a similar kind." The test
is not conclusive as the bailee may have been negligent as to his own
property.
In Louisiana under Civil Code Art. 2937, a depositary is bound
to use the same degree of diligence in preserving a deposit as he uses
in preserving his own property, and is liable if he is unable to explain
the disappearance of a deposit or show freedom from negligence."
In Pbnnsylvania and Texas a depositary is bound to use only good
faith and ordinary care or diligence."
In Illinois a gratuitous bailee is bound to take such care to protect
the property as a prudent man takes of his own property of like
character."
The case of Maddock v. Riggs 2' holds that in the case of a mandatary, good faith requires the same diligence that one might reasonably
be expected to exercise in his own affairs, in view of the nature and
circumstances under which it is deposited and depending sometimes
on the character and confidence of the particular dealing with the
property. The court also holds that reasonable care expected of a
gratuitous bailee is the exercise of the same diligence he might be
expected to exercise in his own affairs. It appears that the court is
treating the term good faith and reasonable care of a gratuitous
bailee as synonymous.
12
Johnson v. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257 (1865); 4 A. L. R. 1205.
"Barrington v. Offenback, 163 N. Y. Supp. 423 (1916).
"Schermer v. Neurath, 54 Md. 491 (1880); Jenkins v. Motlow, 1
Sneed (Tenn.) 248 (1853).
16Carlisle First Natl. Bank v. Grahan, 100 U. S. 699 (1879);
Knowles v. Atlantic & St. R. R. Co. 38 Md.55 (1854).
"Altman V. Aronson,231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 505 (1919).
"'Rubin v. Huhn, 229 Mass. 126, 118 N. E. 290 (1918).
"Boyden v. Bank of Cape Fear, 65 N. C. 13 (1871).
"Supra, Note 3.
"Ray v. Bank of Ky., 10 Bush (Ky.) 344 (1874).
11Supra, Note 7.
"Wheeler Co. v. Chester Steel Spring Co., 73 Pa. Sup. Ct. 119
(1919); Griffin v. Smith, (Tex.) 218 S. W. 33 (1920); Thornton v.
Athens Nat. Bank, (Tex.) 252 S. W. 278 (1923).
(Good faith or ordinary diligence as an ordinary prudent man would exercise as to his
own business).
3Supra, Note 7.
2"1Supra, Note 8.
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The Maine courts hold a gratuitous bailee to reasonable or ordinary care.15 In the case of Maddock v. Riggs, it was held that:
"The so-called distinction between a slight, ordinary and
gross negligence, over which the courts have quibbled for a hundred years can furnish no assistance with respect to the gratuitous
bailment involved."
In this case and in the case of Xubli v. First Natl. Bank,21 affirmed in
later appeal,2 it was pointed out that the three degrees of care and of
negligence were no longer recognized in that state.
The Kentucky court apparently recognizes two degrees of negligence, gross and ordinary negligence.S Ordinary negligence is defined
as the failure to exercise that care which ordinary prudent persons
would exercise in like or similar circumstances.10
In concluding, keeping in mind the observations made above, it
appears apt and suitable to a practical end, to dispense with the use of
the two degrees of negligence, gross and ordinary, recognized by, the
Kentucky courts. Ordinary negligence includes and is concurrent with
gross negligence. The term gross negligence is actually surplusage.
Many courts do not use the term "gross negligence" in fixing the
liability of a gratuitous bailee, obviously realizing the futility of its
application. The broad rule or doctrine, that a person is bound to
exercise that degree of care which a reasonable prudent man would
use under similar circumstances, would suffice.
JoN A. Evxs.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

OF EVIDENCE OF

TRAILING BY BLOODHOUNDS
In 1932, late one afternoon, a person was going home from work,
and, as he passed a cabin on the road, he was felled by a charge of
shotgun pellets. Twenty-four hours after the killing a bloodhound
followed a trail from the cabin to that of another person some two
miles away. This latter person was made the defendant in a prosecution for murder, and was convicted in the county court upon circumstantial evidence, which was mainly that furnished by the bloodhound. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the lower court was reversed for error in the admission of incompetent evidence. The quali' 124 Me. 75, 126 Atl. 180 (1924); Whiting v. Whiting, 111 Me. 13,
87 AtI. 381 (1913).
2*Supra, Note 8.
"'Supra,Note 9.
199 Ia. 194, 200 N. W. 434 (1924).
1 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. BroWn, 186 Ky. 435, 217 S. W. 686
(1919).
W upra, Note 29; Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355, 39 S. W. (2d)
513 (1931); Jackson's Admrs. v. Cose, 239 Ky. 754, 40 S. W. (2d) 343
(1931).

